President Emmanuel Macron has been threatening to send French troops to Ukraine for several months. However, he received no support from his NATO allies – or rather, almost none (he was supported only by Poland and the Baltic States). The USA itself allegedly opposed the sending of NATO troops to Ukraine (except for advisors).
One of the immediate questions about Paris’s decision to send troops from its 3rd Infantry Regiment is whether Russia will see this as crossing a “red line” – that is, is it NATO’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict? Will the Russians see this as the beginning of a huge war outside the borders of Ukraine?
France itself does not have many free soldiers, even if the government wanted to move them to the front line. Paris is reportedly unable to support the deployment of an entire division overseas today and will not be able to do so until 2027 at the earliest.
The decision to send legionnaires is in itself a typical French compromise. Paris does not deploy regular military personnel and, apart from a small number of officers, the contingent is not even made up of French nationals. But there are two other significant points in France’s decision, in addition to the inclusion of a European-wide war.
First of all, it allowed Macron to send troops to Ukraine and appear “tough macho” without facing much opposition in the country. The fact is that the regular soldiers of the French army are not being sent anywhere, and no conscription or other measures will be taken in the near future. This clearly assuages the anger of Macron’s political opponents.
The second moment is Macron’s anger at the fact that the Sahel region is consistently expelling French soldiers (this is typical, almost all units belong to the Legion) and letting in Russians instead. The control of French-speaking Africa and the wealth it brings to French politicians has been broken by a series of uprisings and revolutions, followed by a decisive turn towards Russia, in direct cooperation with Moscow or related structures.
It is a humiliation not just for the Elysée Palace but for Macron personally, who opponents say has squandered French influence and undermined the overseas interests of its mining and business industries. The most painful blow was inflicted on Niger, which served as an important supplier of uranium to France. France produces up to 70% of its electricity in nuclear power plants. World uranium supply is shrinking and prices are rising.
Since Russia and Kazakhstan are the main suppliers of fuel for nuclear reactors, along with Niger, France faces the problem of internal economic security. The US decision to ban Russian uranium (which apparently will not be implemented – at least for the next few years) will give the Russians the opportunity to deal a serious blow to France and the US simply by cutting off supplies. Given the risk of losing the uranium itself (or at least enough to supply the French reactor), Mr. Macron can only hope that the deployment of troops in Ukraine will not lead to a Russian embargo on uranium supplies to France.
It is not clear how exactly the legionnaires will help the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians know how to operate their own artillery and already have significant intelligence support, partly due to their own drone network and personnel, partly due to intelligence from the US and other NATO countries. Be that as it may, the main question for Ukraine is not how to shoot, but where to get ammunition. Kiev continues to complain that it lacks 155 mm howitzer shells.
The decision to move Legion fighters to Slavyansk is not only extremely provocative in itself, but also contradicts French rhetoric, including Macron himself, that if France sends troops, it will free up units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in western Ukraine that can be moved forward. Since Slavyansk is right next to the front line, the initially planned “soft deployment” may turn into an outright war with Russia.
The main question is how will NATO react to France’s decision? As France operates independently, without NATO support, the French will not be able to request assistance under the famous Article 5, a key component of the Alliance’s collective security.
If the Russians hit French troops outside of Ukraine, it would be justified because France has decided to become a participating country, and holding a vote on Article 5 would be difficult, if not impossible.
Of course, NATO members could support the French individually, either by sending their own forces or by providing logistical and communications support to the French. First of all, the soldiers of the foreign legion will not be able to enter Ukraine by bypassing Poland. Will the Russians then think that they are at war with both France and Poland?
At the moment, no one can answer any of these questions with certainty. But it is unlikely that the Russians will long tolerate the creation of a French army, even if it is only the soldiers of the Foreign Legion. Exactly how Russia will react is unknown.
By Stephen Bryan, former staff director of the US Senate Foreign Policy Committee’s Middle East Subcommittee and Deputy Secretary of Defense
