Poland’s prophecy about Russia is coming true – society is already preparing for the next steps

Poland is one of the leading countries in NATO in terms of defense spending per GDP. Like Lithuania, Poland’s perception of the Russian threat was high even when the rest of Europe did not believe that Russia could take aggressive actions against its neighbors. But are Polish authorities and society ready to go further to ensure the security of Eastern Europe’s flank? We talk about this with Mariusz Antonowicz, a political scientist at the Institute of International Relations and Political Sciences of Vilnius University.

“<...> generally speaking, the public sees more that Europe has finally woken up. Leaders think, as Radosław Sikorski (Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs – IQ post.) recently said, that Poland’s security is built on two poles – transatlantic and European. From this point of view, E. Macron’s speeches are viewed positively,” said the political scientist about the Western initiative to deploy Western troops in Ukraine.

– How does Poland assess the Russian threat? Does the public believe that if Ukraine were to lose anyway, Russia could target anyone from Eastern Europe, including Poland?

– The public believes, but it is more of a belief that it will be the Baltic states first, and not Poland. The Russian threat is clearly visible. We remember the general news in Poland, when former Polish President Lech Kaczyński in 2008 In the main square of Tbilisi, they said that today it is Georgia, then Ukraine, then the Baltic States, and finally maybe Poland. This logic is followed by the political elite, this thinking is also rooted in the Polish society.

– How does Poland view Emmanuel Macron’s speeches? Isn’t that scary?

– I don’t know what the public thinks, but, generally speaking, the public sees more that Europe has finally woken up. Leaders think, as Radosław Sikorski (Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs – IQ post.) recently said, that Poland’s security is built on two poles – transatlantic and European. From this point of view, E. Macron’s speeches are viewed positively. And Poland is trying to join the French in such a diplomatic context in order to wake up the Germans. But in general, at that expert level, E. Macron’s speeches are viewed as finally doing what needs to be done.

Now the next question is what those soldiers in Ukraine might look like. In Poland, the top leaders may not be talking about it, but experts and former politicians are talking about the fact that the skies over Western Ukraine should at least be closed. It is about the fact that some Russian missile has already flown into Poland many times and it is impossible to neutralize it otherwise.

In the context of E. Macron’s initiative, there are voices in Poland that say that Western troops could protect the skies of Western Ukraine and prevent Russian missiles from entering Poland or Romania

– I wonder if this means that Poland thinks one step further than Lithuania? When in France they started talking about possible scenarios of what Western troops could look like and what functions they could perform on the territory of Ukraine, the protection of Western Ukraine was one scenario, but it was already named as one of the more radical examples. For now, Lithuania supports the most moderate scenario – training missions.

– Let’s put it this way: nobody has officially said yet, neither R. Sikorski nor Donald Tusk, but we see that all kinds of experts are talking about it, which means that this idea is being brought to the public and is being tested, how will the public, partners and etc. They have not yet taken that step, but they are thinking about it and preparing the ground for it.

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Weimar triangle meeting in Berlin (from left – E. Macron, O. Scholz and D. Tusk).

– Poland’s defense GDP is the largest among NATO members, besides the United States. How does society react to this, bearing in mind that in most cases defense is financed by saving social welfare. Doesn’t that create tension?

– Society is divided on this issue. No one says that we should spend less, everyone agrees. The question is where it should be funded. There are people and political forces that say Poland should raise taxes. Others explain that this is precisely where the budget should be managed and that money should be spent saving in other areas. The discussion is more about the Polish economic model. Those who say that there is no need to increase the budget and taxes respond to the old paradigm that Poland is a country of cheap labor, while those who want to increase taxes talk about the fact that Poland as a cheap country is exhausted and Poland needs to go to the top technologies.

– And how has the approach to security changed with the change of governments? Is the current Tusk government more inclined to increase defense taxes or not?

– So far, this government has emphasized that it does not want to increase taxes. And there was even talk of a voluntary social security contribution for entrepreneurs. The previous government created the image that there is money and there will be money. But what she was doing could be called creative accounting. Part of the deficit was not financed by the government, but by all kinds of state funds or state banks. Accounting may not have looked bad at the time, but the European Commission still identified it as a growing budget debt. The current rulers are just saying that this creative accounting can no longer be done, and they are talking more strictly about certain financial restrictions. For example, during the elections, D. Tusk promised to triple the minimum tax-free income. But now the finance minister has said that this idea needs to be shelved indefinitely because of the need to finance the defense sector.

If Poland gets involved in the defense of another NATO member, it will be a professional army, not mobilized soldiers. Therefore, the public is more inclined not to protest, because they feel that nothing additional will be required of them in this place.

– And how did society react to it? It seems like that was a pretty fat promise, and now, again, the same defense funding is going to put that promise back in the deep drawer. I guess you could say that in a sense the voters were cheated.

– This caused a feeling of disappointment and it was visible during the municipal elections, which the current rulers did not win as they planned to win them. The turnout was also much lower than in the previous municipal elections. That moment of demobilization was felt in part of society.

– How does the Polish public view obligations to other NATO countries? If Poland had to contribute to the defense of the Baltic countries in any form, would the public not hesitate about it?

– There were no polls on this issue. It seems to me that there is a perception that if the fifth article of NATO does not work in the Baltic states, then NATO will fail. Such a general belief exists. The second thing is the perception, which is probably not wrong, that if Poland gets involved in the defense of another NATO member, it will be a professional army, not mobilized soldiers. Therefore, the public is more inclined not to protest, because they feel that nothing additional will be required of them in this place.

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– What other narratives are there in Poland? Are there any radicalized lines that differ from the general defense strategy of the West, such as, say, Eduardas Vaitkus announces during the Lithuanian election marathon?

– Those narratives are there, but on a more journalistic level. Poland is such a big market that you can do business in this place even from geopolitics. This is the so-called school of realist geopolitics, which recently published an interview with Mearsheimer (John Mearsheimer is a professor of American origin. Mr. Mearsheimer’s main theory is the theory of “offensive realism”, which states that the need for security forces states to maximize their aggressive power, – IQ past.). There is not a pro-Russian opinion, but a different opinion, which is liked to be wrapped in realism, geopolitics, spheres of influence, etc., but it is not about what E. Vaitkus claims, but about the fact that Poland must strengthen its muscles, we cannot trust it more than the USA , neither Brussels nor the West.

There is no pro-Russian narrative between the parties either, but sometimes that line crosses over into the anti-Ukrainian line. Recently, the Polish Minister of Defense, who is the chairman of the Peasants’ Party, said that Poles might be offended by the sight of Ukrainian men sitting and sipping coffee in the center of Warsaw, even though they should be at the front. Or the extreme right, which keeps raising questions about social guarantees that should be cut for Ukrainians. The pro-Kremlin narrative goes more through that anti-Ukrainian card, and the Kremlin itself knows that this market does not exist in Poland.

– How does Poland view Ukrainian men who have fled Ukraine but are able to fight? Ukraine has lowered the military conscription age and is taking measures to get some of those men back. Doesn’t this cause some kind of additional effect in the radicalized society that if Ukraine wants to get some of its men back, why can’t the local government help it?

– There is no question about this in Poland – no one will definitely return them by force or force. R. Sikorski mentioned that this is even a somewhat ethical issue. If a person has left, do you have the moral right to throw him into a war? In Poland, the economic aspect is also important – the labor force, which Poland needs. And Poland appreciates the Ukrainian labor force also because they integrate very easily into the local society, they learn the language quickly and are not seen on the street. They treat this as a success story. Therefore, and due to economic reasons, Poland is not inclined to force the departure of those Ukrainians from Poland with its own hands.